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Symmetry and Affinity
Comparing Borders and Border-Making 
Processes in Africa
Paul Nugent
Some of the most contentious issues of our times are framed by interna-
tional borders where acute asymmetries of wealth and power are 
reproduced through systematic practices of exclusion.1 Such is the case 
along the external borders of the European Union (EU) at the interface 
with Africa and the Middle East, and on the border between the United 
States and Mexico. In these paradigmatic instances, we can see two kinds 
of border effect at work. On the one hand, there has been a leveling 
process on the more endowed side of the line as once neglected border 
towns and regions have benefited from their insertion into larger territo-
rial constellations. On the other hand, material deprivation on the opposite 
side has been entrenched by hard lines of separation whose explicit 
purpose is to prevent people from crossing over. The border simultane-
ously serves to remake social boundaries between populations who are 
either favored or stigmatized through a process of profiling and filtering 
that is simultaneously gendered, racialized, and ethnicized. Although the 
processes of patrolling borders and defining boundaries takes place in 
other locations as well, most notably at airports, the effects tend to be 
especially evident at the physical margins. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, stark asymmetries are rather exceptional in 
border regions. Although there are economic hotspots centered on 
resource extraction, standards of living generally tend to be comparable as 
between states. As is well known, the largest oil producers—Nigeria, 
Angola, and Chad—manifest some of the highest levels of poverty. More-
over, the enclave character of the oil industry means that relatively little 
employment is generated. The partial exception to the continental norm 
lies at the interface between South Africa and its neighbors. The mining 
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industry in the former historically drew heavily on migrant labor from 
neighboring states, but numbers employed in this area have greatly 
reduced since the 1990s—with severe consequences for labor-exporting 
countries like Lesotho, where rural populations depended on mine wages 
(Crush et al. 1991). Nevertheless, the diversity and relative strength of the 
South African economy has continued to lure migrants from neighboring 
countries, most notably Zimbabwe, in the direction of the main cities and 
farming areas like the Cape wine lands. But at the borders themselves, 
South African towns are almost as unprepossessing as the settlements next 
door. Across the continent, the manifestation of very similar modes and 
standards of living at the border reflects the reality that populations on 
either side fashion a living from its existence. 
But for all the apparent symmetry, a closer examination does reveal sig-
nificant border effects in Africa as well. Physical (in)security creates 
dynamics that are comparable to the effects of asymmetry where the bor-
der clearly delineates a zone of endemic violence from one where relative 
peace prevails. In these cases, the two sides of a border typically assume 
different physical aspects. Across Africa, borders also serve to differentiate 
populations in more or less subtle ways, albeit with much greater scope for 
negotiation. As I will demonstrate, the inscription of multiple social 
boundaries is intimately bound up with flows of people and goods through 
territorial borders. In this chapter, I deploy a reading of asymmetrical bor-
ders in other parts of the world as a foil for mapping out some of the 
variations across Africa, but with a view to distilling lessons of broader rel-
evance. I take asymmetry to refer to disparities of wealth and power rather 
than to the numerical dimensions of the population living in the border 
zone, although I consider this as an important border effect that is worthy 
of closer consideration. By invoking affinity, I seek to escape a purely 
state-centered perspective and to focus upon some of the ways in which 
populations conceive of, and act upon, the relationships that cut across 
borders. Although border-making might appear to be quintessential state 
work, it may more accurately be regarded as the coproduction of an 
extended cast of state and non-state actors. And it is precisely for this rea-
son that border- and boundary-making processes are so deeply entangled.
Framing Symmetry and Asymmetry
In order to prepare the foundations for a comparative discussion, I begin 
by teasing out four variations that are generally associated with the opera-
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tion of asymmetrical borders. The first concerns uneven levels of state 
presence. Along highly securitized borders there is likely to be a high level 
of visibility regardless of whether there is relative parity between the 
parties (as was initially true of North and South Korea) or a clear asymme-
try (as was historically the case with the Russian–Finnish border). But 
where asymmetry reigns there is typically an interest on the part of the 
more endowed country in enforcing its physical presence at the border, 
which may not be shared by the other party. This is clearly the case around 
the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa and on the US–
Mexico border. Alongside the rather crude symbolism of border fences, 
there has been a re-enchantment with technological solutions to issues of 
surveillance. At the same time, a veritable “illegality industry” (Andersson 
2014) has grown up around the spectacle of surveillance and control (De 
Genova 2012). The less-endowed countries sometimes feel the need to 
keep up the appearance of sovereign equality by mirroring the presence of 
state agencies on their side of the line, but they have less invested in regu-
lating border flows—unless they have been incentivized by the dominant 
neighbor to cooperate. 
The second variation turns on the proliferation of networks of evasion 
feeding off the rents that are created by the creation and enforcement of 
hard borders. The activities that steal the headlines involve networks that 
are oriented toward the infiltration of elements that wealthier states are 
intent on excluding at any cost—namely people and narcotics. As a general 
rule, the harder the border, the greater the risks associated with crossing 
it, the higher the rents, and the more hierarchical the networks. But 
clearly the nature of what is being transported also has a bearing on the 
configurations. Drug cartels in South and Central America are highly 
monopolistic in nature and have been maintained through the active 
threat of violence (Payan 2006). The trafficking of people and drugs across 
the Sahara is somewhat more loosely organized, although the “mafias” are 
closely connected to the cartels in South America (Scheele 2012: 94–124).
The third variation is a peculiar form of demography, as populations are 
drawn to specific nodes within the borderlands (Nugent 2012). Border-
lands are sometimes characterized by low population densities, but 
elsewhere asymmetrical borders suck in aspirant migrants, only to redis-
tribute them in an uneven fashion across border spaces. The twin cities 
that have sprung up along the length of the US–Mexico border provide the 
classic instances. Here wealthier, but relatively small, American cities 
such as El Paso have become a focus for Mexican populations seeking a 
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better life. Much larger “trampoline towns” like Ciudad Juarez have 
emerged on the Mexican side, replenished by fresh arrivals from across the 
country and even further afield. El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, or Laredo and 
Nuevo Laredo, are intimately connected despite the existence of a rela-
tively hard border.2
Finally, a distinct politics of identity tends to play itself out in asymmet-
rical borderlands. For countries that seek to restrict immigration, it is 
often convenient to emphasize the “otherness” of those whom they seek to 
deny entry to. Hence at the southern borders of Europe, governments have 
asserted their right to restrict entry to migrants and refugees, whilst 
blurring the distinction between them—which is at least implicitly justi-
fied on the basis of religious and or/racial difference. At the same time, the 
phenomenon of the daily commute across the US–Mexico border demon-
strates that governments can also create states of exception when it suits 
them. At the busiest crossing of all, between Tijuana and San Diego, some 
90,000 people cross the border each day—many who live in the former 
and work in the latter. The flip side is that border populations may them-
selves claim a close bond with people on the other side of the line, 
subverting the state’s claim to a monopoly of defining the terms of belong-
ing. Hence the racialization of Mexicans has its counterpart in claims to 
affinity between Mexican Americans and their cousins from across the 
line. As Jiménez (2010) demonstrates, Mexican Americans in the border 
states generally empathize with the desire of their counterparts from 
Mexico to find a better life—which is ironically justified with reference to 
the American dream—but they are able to revive their own ethnic identity 
through regular contact with immigrants. This is despite some ambiva-
lence about the illegality that pervades the process of gaining entry to the 
United States in the first place. 
Symmetry and Affinity in African Border Regions
Uneven levels of state presence
When it comes to matters of state presence, there is clearly considerable 
variation across Africa. One of the ironies is that the states with the least 
institutional capacity have typically been tasked with maintaining the 
longest borders. This is especially true of those located in the Sahel and 
the Horn of Africa. Where forests or drylands have been deployed as a 
buffer, states have often maintained only a token presence at the physical 
border. The latter have provided ideal sites for the incubation of rebel 
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insurgencies that have deployed the terrain to good effect. This has been 
true, for example, of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and Sudan since the 1960s. Somalia is a singular case because the notional 
government does not control much territory outside of Mogadishu. But 
even states that might appear to have much greater capacity to control 
their borders have sometimes struggled to assert an effective presence 
when push has come to shove. The ease with which a combination of 
Tuareg secessionists fighting for the independence of Azawad, and Isla-
mists affiliated with al-Qaeda, were able to cross borders and eventually 
overrun half of Mali in 2012 provides a pointed illustration of that reality. 
This is equally true of the manner in which Boko Haram established bases 
in the forest reserves of northeastern Nigeria and successfully beat back 
the Nigerian army over 2013/14. In this case, self-proclaimed jihadists 
claiming an adherence to Islamic State were able to exploit the lack of 
state presence in Nigeria as well as in the borderlands of Cameroon and 
Chad. In the process of defining a new moral community, and hence 
demarcating a social boundary, Boko Haram also identified Christians and 
most fellow Muslims as apostates who could justifiably be targeted for acts 
of violence. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania have found it convenient to 
locate large refugee camps in close proximity to international borders not 
merely to physically contain refugees, but also to establish a physical pres-
ence in marginal zones where state control has historically been tenuous. 
Whereas Uganda has established rather open settlements, Tanzania has 
sought to restrict movement beyond the confines of designated camps—
thereby underlining the alterity of refugees and restricting their access to 
sources of income. The irony here is that the creation of a social boundary, 
in which refugees are pointedly placed outside the category of potential 
citizen, is what has enabled the state to stake out its physical borders.
It would be misleading to think of the border wilderness as anything 
like the norm because the margins in Africa are often rather densely pop-
ulated (see below). They characteristically pulsate with economic activity, 
which in turn ensures that state institutions are very present on the 
ground. The African continent is currently undergoing a process of 
“re-spacing” through the combined effects of regional integration initia-
tives driven by various regional economic communities (RECs) and 
large-scale investments in infrastructure pursued by African governments, 
international financial institutions, China, the EU, and to a lesser extent 
by private corporations (Nugent 2018). Transport corridors, which are 
sometimes accorded the more grandiose label of development corridors, 
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lie at the intersection of both of these sets of interventions. They typically 
have a seaport like Mombasa or Walvis Bay at one end and a capital city or 
a mining center at the other—with upgraded road and rail networks 
linking them together. There are, however, significant differences between 
the many corridors. Whereas investments in the Walvis Bay Corridors are 
heavily geared to the extraction of mineral resources (notably copper), the 
Northern and Central Corridors in East Africa are justified with reference 
to facilitating the flow of imported goods as well as non-mineral exports. 
The Abidjan–Lagos Corridor (home to some 35 million people) is different 
again, in that it is justified with reference to the vast sprawl stretching 
from Lagos along the coastline, which potentially creates synergies arising 
out of the agglomeration effects associated with urbanism.
The border towns that are dotted along the corridors have historically 
functioned as the choke points where customs, immigration, and police 
have conducted their formalities and regulated the passage of people and 
goods. The lengthy delays and corruption that are characteristic of border 
crossings have been widely cited as the reasons for the high cost of doing 
business in Africa. This has the greatest implications for the landlocked 
states of West and Central Africa, for whom transport costs amount to 
some 45 percent of the value of imports and 35 percent of the value of 
exports—as opposed to the global average of 5.4 percent and 8.8 percent 
respectively (Viljoen 2016). Much of the cost is directly related to the 
hours, and even days, wasted in crossing borders. Part of the reason is 
inadequate infrastructure, such as the lack of crossable bridges, but as 
important is the duplication of procedures. In the context of regional inte-
gration, the stated priority is to actively reduce barriers to the free 
movement of goods, but also to assist the mobility of citizens within a 
given REC. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
has been in the vanguard with respect to the freedom of movement of 
people since 1979, whereas the East African Community (EAC) has led the 
way in trade facilitation and infrastructural investment.3 
Ironically, the emphasis on facilitating border flows has imparted a 
heightened significance to the state management of border crossings. The 
EU is seeking to export its own model of an integrated boundary manage-
ment system that will enable state institutions at the border to share data 
between themselves. Other donors are involved in harmonizing record 
systems that will permit agencies, most notably customs, to create and 
access the same documents. At the same time, governments and donors 
are rolling out one-stop border posts where a range of state institutions 
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from neighboring countries can work alongside each other, thereby 
halving the bureaucratic formalities. These reforms necessarily presume a 
mirroring of institutions at border crossings and require an active presence 
from both states. The construction of new border facilities and informa-
tion systems frequently runs up against the realities of erratic electricity 
supplies and inadequate telecommunications infrastructure. Hence it has 
often been necessary to improve the connectivity of border towns. This 
upgrading has attracted ancillary businesses, most notably banks and 
logistics companies. Crucially for our purposes, it has also meant that a 
wider range of institutions and private actors has become invested in the 
dynamics of border towns.
However, significant tensions have emerged with respect to the man-
agement of mobility in particular. One arises out of the efforts of the EU to 
physically transplant its efforts to restrict the flow of would-be migrants. 
The European border force, Frontex, has enlisted African governments in 
a campaign to stem illegal migration at source by patrolling the West 
African coastline, but also by intercepting potential migrants at border 
crossings in the Sahel—long before the latter attempt the Sahara crossing 
(Andersson 2014: 100–36). Whereas freedom of movement is guaranteed 
to all ECOWAS citizens, people from coastal countries who enter the 
Sahel are often detained on a presumption of intent to reach Europe ille-
gally—even though no actual crime has been committed. At the same 
time, African governments have sought to deal with the threat of terrorism 
by profiling border-crossers in ways that are in tension with the principle 
of freedom of movement. This is effected in part for reasons of national 
security and also in response to requests from external actors, most notably 
the United States and France. Given the ongoing campaign of al-Shabaab 
against Kenya and Uganda, for example, travellers who appear to be Somali 
are often singled out for special treatment in East Africa. Not surprisingly, 
the technologies of surveillance have become more sophisticated in recent 
years (Frowd 2018). While it is true that the implementation is often 
uneven, as well as inconsistent, the biometric border has traveled from 
airports to land borders, where finger prints are routinely taken. The 
concerns surrounding illegal immigration and terrorism together render 
border surveillance a genuine priority for African governments. Because 
this happens to coincide with the agenda of Western countries, it has been 
rather easy to secure external assistance to pay for the necessary equip-
ment and training. While the integrated border management agenda is 
justified with reference to the benefits associated with more efficient data 
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collection and sharing, it is clearly not devoid of political intent. It also 
complicates the regional integration agenda of RECs that have, for 
example, been seeking to dispense with passport requirements.
Networks of evasion
Networks of evasion are very extensive in most African border regions, 
relating more to the pursuit of trade than to migratory flows. Historically, 
there have been high levels of mobility within the continent, especially in 
West and Southern Africa. In the Senegambia region, for example, large 
numbers of migrants from Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau 
have resided in Senegal, while the Gambia has been home to substantial 
numbers of Senegalese. Crossing borders has been considered mundane, 
and governments have not considered it prudent or necessary to interfere 
too much—except during moments of inter-state crisis such as that which 
followed the border clash between Senegal and Mauritania and which set 
off tit-for-tat expulsions in the early 1990s. The southward extension of 
Frontex has brought some of the networks of evasion in North Africa to 
the Senegambia itself. But it does not (yet) appear that there are highly 
organized human-trafficking rings operating across most of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The issue of child trafficking between African countries is often 
said to be pervasive, and immigration officials are specifically trained to 
detect its incidence at border crossings. But evidence of pervasive traffick-
ing networks is limited. Indeed, it is difficult to detect a strong economic 
driver even for domestic labor, given that a large pool of vulnerable 
children exists in most African countries anyway. 
By contrast, the economic logic behind the trafficking in smuggled 
goods remains as powerful as ever. For the first three decades of indepen-
dence, African countries pursued competitive economic strategies that 
created abundant opportunities for smuggling. In West Africa, for example, 
the more substantial countries like Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana attempted 
to build national industries—which were typically state-owned—behind 
the protection of tariff walls. Neighboring countries—most notably Togo, 
Benin, and the Gambia—functioned as archetypal entrepôts, that is as 
microstates that had very little industry of their own but got by on the 
basis of tapping international trade. They actively encouraged the import 
of consumer goods through their ports, which were then taxed and dis-
patched across borders in the shape of contraband. This undercut fledgling 
industries, such as textiles or sugar production, in the neighboring coun-
tries. Under structural adjustment programs, much of the protection for 
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state industries was removed, but a stimulus was provided to other forms 
of trade across borders (Walther 2014: 194–5). In the current era of 
regional integration, the harmonization of customs values and internal 
taxes has reduced many of the economic rents that formerly sustained 
smuggling. But the continued existence of different currencies, the reten-
tion of consumer subsidies (for example on petroleum products), and the 
remaining vestiges of industrial protectionism have all meant that smug-
gling remains a highly profitable business. Nigeria has, for example, 
delayed the implementation of a common external tariff and has insisted 
on upholding a list of prohibited imports and imposing high tariffs on 
“strategic” commodities, such as rice. The net effect has been to extend a 
renewed lease of life to the contraband trade centered on the port of 
Cotonou. Benin has embraced the logic of regional integration by promot-
ing a rail link to Mali, but at the same time it has continued to function as 
a classic entrepôt state. Much of the smuggling across the continent is 
transacted in items of everyday consumption, such as wheat flour, Thai 
rice, and Chinese batteries. But there are also some items to which some 
value is attached and which require greater levels of organization within 
the supply chain. The attempt to sever the links between diamond mining 
and violent conflict through certification under the Kimberley Process has 
fueled smuggling across international borders—with the DRC being a 
major supplier of illicit diamonds to the rest of the world. Much of the 
trafficking in ivory for the Asian market, and skins used in Chinese 
medicine, takes place by road for the simple reason that these are easily 
concealed amongst other consignments and are difficult to detect without 
functioning scanners—which are a rare occurrence at most of Africa’s land 
borders. The rerouting of the South American drugs trade, and in particu-
lar cocaine, through West Africa is a case of the internationalization of 
criminal networks (Klantschnig 2013)—with profound consequences for 
Guinea-Bissau, where it has become deeply entwined with the politics of 
the country. Although much of the narcotics trade has been routed through 
airports, improvements in the technologies of detection in countries like 
Ghana and Nigeria have meant that drugs have also entered Europe by 
boat and along land routes through the desert. 
One of the distinctive patterns of cross-border trading in Africa is the 
role of ethnic and religious networks in cementing essential bonds of 
trust, both between partners of an equivalent size and between larger mer-
chants and smaller traders. Long-distance trade has historically been 
associated with particular ethnic groups, such as the Dyula and Hausa of 
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West Africa, who remain deeply invested in cross-border trading to this 
day. But the emergence of lucrative seams of commerce since the 1970s 
has also facilitated the emergence of novel networks. A case in point 
would be the so-called Nana Benz of Togo, the market women who came 
to dominate the cloth trade from the Grand Marché in Lomé. After inde-
pendence, Dutch and British wax prints were imported through the port 
by multinational trading firms and then distributed by the Nana Benz 
throughout the sub-region (Sylvanus 2016). Much of the cloth was sold 
into Ghana, whose own factories came close to collapse in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The lucrative textile trade was controlled by wealthy 
female traders, and in particular by Minas who originated from eastern 
Togo rather than from Lomé itself. They were, in turn, suppliers to a much 
larger group of middling and smaller traders. As the counterfeit cloth 
trade with China took off around the turn of the millennium, a much 
greater range of actors entered the field, and the Nana Benz forfeited their 
de facto monopoly. What stands out in this instance is the convergence 
between international commerce and cross-border flows on the one hand, 
and the demarcation of an entirely female domain that is spatially 
embodied within the urban landscape of Lomé on the other. 
A rather different instance is that of the Mouride trading network of the 
Senegambia—which is Muslim, primarily Wolof in terms of its ethnic 
composition, and dominated by men. The Mourides are a Sufi religious 
order that was initially closely associated with the expansion of groundnut 
production in Senegal before its adherents turned their backs on farming 
and became heavily urbanized from the mid-1970s onward. The Mourides 
stand out from the other Muslim orders in the sub-region by virtue of an 
internal structure that is simultaneously hierarchical, being centered on 
the relationship between a religious cheikh and his talibés (followers), and 
yet flexible enough to facilitate its extension as a network. After indepen-
dence, the Mouride capital of Touba was granted an exceptional status, 
likened by Senegalese to the Vatican, where state institutions like the 
police were absent from the scene. The Mourides became deeply impli-
cated in the contraband trade with the Gambia in the 1970s, where they 
accessed Asian goods that sold more cheaply in Senegal than both the 
French equivalent and the products of local factories. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the Mourides controlled much of the illicit trade across the greater 
Senegambia region and they remain prominently placed to this day—even 
if smuggling through the Gambia has lost much of its rationale as Chinese 
goods have entered directly through the port of Dakar. What was originally 
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a village expanded rapidly, in large part by virtue of the commercial advan-
tages that the unique status conferred, with the result that Touba grew to 
become Senegal’s second city. The Mourides also moved in large numbers 
to Dakar, and subsequently became heavily invested in international 
migration, especially in the direction of France and Italy, where they 
became closely associated with street trading. 
If we compare the Nana Benz and the Mourides, we can discern some 
of the complex ways in which border- and boundary-making have become 
intertwined. The Nana Benz carved out a distinct identity that was 
gendered and largely ethnic in character, and that depended on the repro-
duction of international borders and the economic rents associated with 
them. The space that they claimed as their own was physically concen-
trated at the commercial heart of the Togolese capital. At an earlier point 
in history, the Mourides created their own center that was deliberately 
located away from the colonial capital of Dakar. The religious network was 
built upon absolute allegiance to a cheikh who acted both as a religious 
interlocutor and a social protector. The Mouride order greatly expanded in 
numbers and influence when its adherents embraced the commercial 
advantages that came with cross-border trade and subsequently the oppor-
tunities for migration to Europe. The financial flows back to Senegal, 
which sustained both the religious leadership and extended families, have 
enabled the Mourides to adapt to changing circumstances. Today, there 
are multiple layers to the social identity of the Mourides. It is strongly 
associated with being Senegalese, and yet it actively embraces a world-
liness that is threatened by stricter European immigration regimes. It is 
associated with Islam, but with innovations that make it distinct even 
from other Sufi orders in Senegal. And while the public perception of the 
Mourides emphasizes close solidarity between young men, they clearly 
have a substantial female following.
Under conditions where trade is characterized by high risk, whether by 
virtue of the nature of what is being traded or the insecure environment 
in which it is carried out, the networks tend to be more hierarchical and 
densely configured. While cigarette smuggling by boat between Libya 
and Egypt involves groups of young men who are connected through 
“tribal” ties, the trafficking in arms, people, and drugs between Libya and 
the Sahara is dominated by close-knit and heavily armed networks that 
do not hinge on kinship solidarities (Hüsken 2017: 907–9). The same is 
true of the “mafias” operating on the border between Mali and Algeria, 
which are based on personal ties rather than the established religious-
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cum-commercial networks, and are surrounded by a distinct aura of 
unsociability (Scheele 2012: 123). In regions where there is a high risk 
of banditry, militia attacks, or irregular seizures by state and quasi-state 
actors (it is not always so easy to tell them apart), merchants have to 
provide their own military security—or purchase it elsewhere. In the trade 
between the eastern DRC and its neighbors, where the risks are especially 
acute, a small number of players has come to dominate the most lucrative 
lines of trade. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and the flight 
of Hutu populations across the border, North and South Kivu became 
highly volatile regions of the DRC. Endemic insecurity did not sever 
trade, and indeed created its own war economy of sorts (Jackson 2006), 
but it did change the ways in which trust operated. Raeymaekers (2015) 
has explored the logics of a protection economy in which large merchants 
depended on the security afforded by military enforcers, but increasingly 
set the rules of the game themselves—thereby creating what he depicts as 
a hybridized system of governance. In a separate study of trade between 
the DRC and Uganda, Titeca (2012) similarly identifies the consolidation 
of economic power in the hands of a small group of well-connected 
“tycoons.” In the Great Lakes region, the pervasive threat of spoliation 
is what enables the most lucrative commerce to remain concentrated 
in the hands of the few who possess the means to defend their interests. 
The effects are, therefore, broadly similar to the ways in which the high 
risks associated with trafficking across asymmetrical borders promotes 
hierarchical and highly concentrated networks.
Demography
As I have already indicated, border regions are frequently amongst the 
most densely populated, especially in West Africa, Central Africa and the 
Great Lakes region (Soi & Nugent 2017). Indeed, Africa has its own 
variants of the twinned towns and cities phenomenon. And much like on 
the US–Mexico border, the pattern is one of uneven growth between 
urban settlements. The cities of Kinshasa and Brazzaville provide the only 
instance in the world where two capital cities face each other across an 
international border defined by the Congo River.4 In this case, Kinshasa is 
several times larger than Brazzaville. Together, they are home to some 13 
million people, many of whom make a living in one way or another from 
trade across the dangerous river boundary. This is not likely to change, 
given that the prolific expansion of Kinshasa is predicted to continue 
unabated over the next three decades. Indeed, according to some projec-
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tions Kinshasa will overtake Lagos and Cairo by 2025, with a projected 
population of 16.8 million people. In addition, a large number of Africa’s 
capital cities are either located on an international border—typically along 
a navigable river—or within 50 kilometers of one. In several cases, capitals 
like Bangui and N’Djamena face smaller towns on the other side of the 
border which derive much of their vitality from the proximity between 
them. Finally, there are innumerable instances of border towns that have 
grown up in an intimate relationship with one another. In East Africa, 
there are several towns that share the same name: such as Busia, Uganda 
and Busia, Kenya, or Moyale, Kenya and Moyale, Ethiopia. In almost every 
case, the factors behind the consolidation of these urban clusters involve 
some combination between the selection of an administrative headquar-
ters and the opportunities that derive from the existence of the border. A 
particularly fascinating example is Lomé and its Ghanaian neighbor, Aflao, 
whose border crossing literally opens into the downtown area of the 
Togolese capital. Aflao already existed in the seventeenth century, whereas 
Lomé was founded by smugglers seeking to escape British Customs duties 
after the declaration of the eastern border of the Gold Coast in 1879. After 
independence, Lomé expanded rapidly as the Togolese capital, but also as 
the epicenter of the contraband trade (see above). Aflao was an important 
partner in and beneficiary from this trade, which is reflected in the reality 
that its population grew significantly more quickly than other towns in 
Ghana. There is a close affinity between the populations of these settle-
ments—given that specific quarters of the Togolese capital trace their 
origins to Aflao—but they have both drawn in populations from much 
further afield, including the Mina, who I have mentioned above.
Patterns of urban growth have also been shaped in significant ways by 
the security imbalances that have already been identified. Across Africa, 
high rates of urbanization are closely correlated with patterns of sustained 
violence—Angola being the classic case of a country that has experienced 
rural depopulation as a consequence of decades of civil war. Much of this 
urban growth is reflected at the geographical margins, where populations 
have a greater chance of seeking sanctuary across the border. Although the 
existence of large-scale refugee camps is well known, a pattern character-
istic of relatively low-level insurgencies is one in which populations 
relocate to the more secure side of the border during times of trouble. 
Hence Gambian border towns have accommodated large numbers of 
people from the Casamance whenever the secessionist insurgency in 
Senegal has heated up, but then there has been a reverse flow when a sem-
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blance of normality has returned. These movements are based on 
established relationships, cemented by kinship and religious ties, between 
towns on the two sides of the border. Needless to say, these are towns 
where the livelihoods of much of the population revolves around the 
opportunities for cross-border trade.
Much as instability has been confined to the Casamance side of the 
Senegal–Gambia border, Uganda has experienced long periods of acute 
instability in a way that Kenya has not. Amidst the privation of the Amin 
years, when basic consumer goods ceased to be available in Uganda, a 
flourishing contraband trade with Kenya sprang up. This imparted a par-
ticular significance to the relationship between the two Busias. Smugglers 
from Busia, Uganda, often using bicycles, ran the gauntlet of military sur-
veillance, but continued to take the risk because of attractive financial 
returns. However, because of the dangers associated with exhibiting 
wealth in Uganda at a time when the military was not bound by any rules, 
very little investment was evident. Most of the demographic growth and 
physical construction (especially well-stocked stores) was manifested in 
Busia, Kenya, a difference that was further magnified when the latter was 
elevated to an administrative center. When peace returned to the Ugandan 
side of the border, Busia, Uganda, assumed the role of a truck stop on the 
route from Mombasa. In recent years, however, Busia has acquired its own 
minor position within the Ugandan administrative hierarchy, and a range 
of businesses, including banks and filling stations, have grown up around 
the one-stop border post. There is a perception that property is more 
expensive in Kenya, while much of the electoral violence in recent years 
has played itself out in Busia, Kenya. This means that traders are much 
more likely to invest in Busia, Uganda, than before. The net consequence 
has been a narrowing of the gap between the towns with respect to both 
population and the quality of the built environment. 
In the eastern DRC, a rather different pattern has taken shape based on 
the permanent displacement of rural populations toward the border. 
Goma has progressed from the status of a modest provincial town to a 
metropolis of more than 1 million people, while Bukavu is estimated to 
harbor a further 832,000. This is not a matter of the bright lights so much 
as a reflection of the reality that the city provides a relatively safe haven at 
a time when the rural hinterlands of North and South Kivu are rife with 
armed militias that routinely target civilian populations. The existence of 
the border provides a source of income for the many men and women who 
trade, transport goods, cook food, change money, and do all the other 
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things that are associated with busy border crossings. What is striking is 
that the Rwandan towns of Gisenyi and Cyangugu, which face Goma and 
Bukavu across the border, have not expanded to anything like the same 
degree—despite the much greater level of physical security. The Rwandan 
administration clearly has no interest in encouraging Congolese settle-
ment, with all the problems that this might entail. But it is equally true 
that displaced populations need to find a way of making a living, and this 
is easier in Goma than in Gisenyi, where economic activities are more 
closely regulated by the Rwandan state.5 Despite the greater incidence of 
daily crime in Goma, border workers generally choose to reside there in 
preference to the more “orderly” Rwandan towns next door. The pattern 
that I have identified from the Uganda–Kenya border is therefore reversed 
in an interesting fashion.
The politics of identity 
As has been widely noted, a discourse of autochthony has come into play 
across the continent over recent decades (Bøås & Dunn 2013; Geschiere 
2009). In fact, there have been earlier iterations of something very similar, 
most notably with the expulsion of foreigners from Ghana in 1969 and 
from Nigeria in 1983, and the excision of the Ugandan Asians in 1972. In 
countries like Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville, the struggle has really 
turned on claims to ownership of particular spaces, including specific 
urban quartiers, rather than arguments about national citizenship. But in 
Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa it has also been about defining the bound-
aries of national belonging, in which state categories and vernacular 
discourses of belonging have become closely intertwined. Inevitably, it has 
also involved some contestation over the ways in which national borders 
have been superimposed upon ethnic ones.
In the Ivoirien case, the political crisis turned on whether most north-
erners were actually Burkinabe. For southern activists seeking to advance 
the claims of putative autochthons, northerners were almost by definition 
suspect. The context was one in which a quarter of the population were 
immigrants by the 1990s, a large proportion of whom had been attracted 
to work on the cocoa farms of the forest belt. The complication in this case 
is that the borders of colonial Upper Volta changed several times over, 
enabling some supposed Burkinabe to make a historic claim to being 
Ivoirien at an earlier point in their history. Others laid claim to being 
Ivoirien on the basis of having been born in Côte d’Ivoire to parents who 
migrated decades before. And finally, most northerners insisted they had 
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always been Ivoirien and had a right, as citizens, to reside, work, and 
acquire land in any part of the country. For the supporters of the former 
president Laurent Gbagbo, the invocation of a foreign threat was largely an 
exercise in seeking to reduce the number of northern voters, through 
exclusion from citizenship, rather than seeking to redraw the borders of 
Côte d’Ivoire.
In South Africa, the pressure to tackle illegal immigration has led the 
South African authorities to actively police urban spaces where foreigners 
reside in large numbers, and to resort to mass deportations—amounting 
to no fewer than 300,000 in 2007 alone (Landau 2010: 215). One of the 
cruel ironies of the recurring xenophobic attacks has been the targeting of 
South African Tsonga and Venda populations, who are collectively labeled 
as Shangaan. Because these groups straddle international borders, the 
assumption is that they are most likely foreigners who have crossed over 
from neighboring countries (Tafira 2011: 118). In this way, certain ethnic-
ities are deemed to be unproblematically part of the nation while others 
are treated as alien or at least highly suspect—with language proficiency 
often providing the litmus test in any given, often charged, situation. The 
populations who are targeted, on the other hand, contend that their fore-
bears were in situ before the borders were drawn.
The assumption that the contours of international borders neatly 
conform to ethnic boundaries is, of course, one that runs entirely counter 
to the view that populations were arbitrarily dissected by colonial borders. 
A.I. Asiwaju, who may fairly be regarded as the father of African border 
studies, edited a seminal volume in which he helpfully provided a check-
list of partitioned ethnic groups (Asiwaju 1984: 252–9). The list is 
extensive, but even then it is incomplete. The Agotime who straddle the 
Ghana–Togo border, for example, are not included in the checklist, seem-
ingly because they are bundled into the Ewe category. But such problems 
of classification also illustrate the difficulties of assuming clearly bounded 
ethnicities in the first place. Colonial borders helped to shape the way in 
which ethnic groups were classified, and the manner in which ethnicity 
was subsequently expressed. Hence the Agotime have tended to be assim-
ilated to the Ewe category despite being an Adangbe splinter group with 
close links to the Ga of what is now coastal Ghana. On the Kenya–Uganda 
border, closely related populations do not deploy the same ethnonyms, 
although they are well aware of the affinities between them. The point 
nevertheless remains that closely related populations frequently live on 
two sides of a border, with the multiple ambiguities that this entails. The 
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trap lies in conceiving of borderlanders as purely the victims—intended or 
otherwise—of a dispensation conjured up by external agents. Border pop-
ulations have been equally adept at instrumentalizing borders and 
enlisting the support of states in the process. Elsewhere, I have examined 
the ways in which litigants involved in land disputes on the Ghana–Togo 
border deliberately conflated international borders with the borders 
between chiefdoms in order to stake contentious claims and to delegiti-
mize those of their opponents (Nugent 2002). Similarly, Dereje (2011) has 
revealed how the Anywaa have sought to entrench the Ethiopia–Sudan 
border in a way that casts pastoralist Nuer populations, with whom they 
have been struggling over land, as foreigners. These instances demon-
strate that borderlanders are as invested in the making of borders, and are 
often as adept at deploying the language of citizenship as the state and 
non-state actors are.
But there are also other ways in which populations relate to borders. As 
I have already indicated, border towns are often rather cosmopolitan 
places that suck in strangers from further afield. Hence, the visible 
presence of Igbo and Yoruba traders from southern Nigeria in towns on 
the northern Benin–Nigeria border (Walther 2014: 196), of Igbos trading 
in Gabonese border towns (Bennafla 2002: 137) and of Hausa traders 
operating in Agotime. The paramount chief of Aflao is distinctly proud of 
the fact that his town hosts migrants from across West Africa, and he 
speaks especially highly of the way in which the “Malians” (the largest 
group) have organized themselves.6 However, it is also true that border 
populations may also lay claim to the border as a resource that belongs pri-
marily to notional indigenes. As Flynn (1997) has demonstrated for the 
Benin–Nigeria border, locals may claim co-ownership of border spaces 
with the state by imposing their own controls and levies on what passes 
through. At the one-stop border posts on the Uganda–Kenya border it is 
striking that money changers insist on the right to operate inside the 
perimeter fence on the grounds that the facility is built on “their land.” 
Such assertions of local ownership are, in practice, compatible with the 
presence of strangers who specialize in particular lines of commerce that 
indigenes have less of an interest in, or specialist knowledge of.
A rather different, but hardly contradictory, response is the assertion of 
a close affinity between people across the line. Borderlanders routinely 
intermarry, patronize rotating weekly markets, attend each other’s schools 
and health clinics, and engage in joint religious observances. But it has not 
always been so easy to turn such daily interactions into an expression of a 
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common identity. Governments tend to be acutely suspicious of efforts to 
discursively transcend the border because they regard it as a slippery slope 
to secessionism. Cross-border festivals afford a convenient way of making 
statements about the ties that bind, but in a manner that does not appear 
overtly threatening—especially when state actors can be drawn into the 
performance. The chief of Aflao is proud of the fact that his annual festival, 
Godigbe, attracts participants from Togo and as far afield as Benin. The 
festival therefore makes a statement about connectivity and affinity across 
two sets of borders. The Agotime have worked hard at promoting their 
own annual festival, Agbamevoza. During the three decades after indepen-
dence when relations between the two sets of authorities were distinctly 
tense, it proved impossible to hold any public events in common, but the 
slow thaw from the mid-1990s provided an opportunity that Agotime 
leaders seized upon with alacrity. Agbamevoza is a week-long series of 
events that seeks to unify the Agotime around a shared sense of a place in 
history and their virtuosity in the production of the highest-quality kente 
cloth (Nugent 2019: 502–6). Whereas the events used to be held on the 
Ghana side of the border only, these days the festival shuttles back and 
forth across the line and involves the participation of state officials from 
both sides.
Ironically, however, because the border has been a hard one for so long, 
what it means to be Agotime in Ghana is not the same as what it means to 
be Agotime in Togo. As one informant explained, it is the “Ghanaians”—
by which he also meant Ghanaian Agotime—who like to wear kente cloth 
on special occasions, whereas the Togolese prefer to don suits and wax 
prints. The Agotime seem to have succeeded in reminding the authorities 
that they are one people divided by an international border. The challenge 
now is to agree on what “Agotimeness” itself consists of. This conscious 
attempt to alter the meaning attached to the border is not to be confused 
with secessionist claims that have been on the rise across the continent. In 
subtle ways, festivals may even serve to reinscribe rather than challenge 
the legitimacy of the borders in question. But what they also do is to open 
up a space for negotiation about how the border is managed, much as they 
do in Laredo and Nuevo Laredo along the US–Mexico border.7
Conclusion
In this chapter I have deployed the asymmetrical border in other regions 
of the world as a foil for understanding the ways in which borders function 
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and interact with social boundaries in Africa. I have avoided the tempta-
tion to draw overly sharp distinctions between Europe and the Americas 
on the one hand and Africa on the other, despite some very obvious differ-
ences. To be sure, along the familiar asymmetrical borders there are strict 
controls on migration, whereas the norm has been an acceptance of high 
levels of mobility across most of Africa, which is now formally sanctioned 
by regional integration agreements. Moreover, there are relatively few 
securitized borders in Africa—the heavily militarized Ethiopia–Eritrea 
border providing the obvious exception. Again, the development of hierar-
chical networks of evasion geared to the trafficking of people and narcotics 
has been a distinctive feature of asymmetrical borders. But as Europe has 
pushed its own border policing southward, and as much of the cocaine 
trade has shifted to Africa, some of the same dynamics are now present 
south of the Sahara. In addition, the phenomenon of twin cities and towns 
is widespread and underlines the transformative role of border flows and 
blockages. Whereas on the US–Mexico border peripheral urbanism is 
driven by the migration imperative, in Africa it is the economic opportu-
nities that are encrusted around borders that draws people toward them. 
But even this has some parallels with the operations of the informal 
economy at the US–Mexico border. 
I have gone on to argue that chronic insecurity creates effects that are 
similar to those we associate with evasion along asymmetrical borders. 
High risks to life and capital in the pursuit of cross-border commerce are 
conducive to the consolidation of hierarchical networks involving the 
primacy of political connections, fewer players, and tight-knit relation-
ships based on something other than kinship. Insecurity is also closely 
bound up with demographic growth in border regions, although the 
patterns differ significantly by region. When it comes to affinities, one 
needs to be equally nuanced in thinking through the larger comparisons. 
Although it is common to conceive of the Mediterranean as marking a 
cultural boundary, it has historically functioned more as a crossroads 
between North Africa and southern Europe (Clancy-Smith 2011). And 
clearly, there are close affinities between Mexican Americans and their 
kinsmen across the southern border which have been revalorized in the 
context of the resurgence of white American nativism. Conversely, cultur-
ally similar populations in African border regions have not always made 
much of an effort to embrace their apparent similarities.
In unlocking the precise relationship between borders and boundaries, 
I have subjected four dimensions to closer investigation. When it comes to 
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state presence, I have pointed to the challenges that some states have 
faced in controlling remote border regions that have provided a fertile 
breeding ground for insurgencies. I have also underlined some of the 
tensions between a regional integration agenda, which seeks to facilitate 
the freedom of movement of citizens of member states, and a security 
agenda which seeks to impose more effective regulation. The efforts of the 
EU to tie African states into measures designed to restrict migratory flows 
has added a further layer of complexity. The net effect has been to forge 
new strategies of surveillance and practices of selective exclusion.
Secondly, I have demonstrated that networks of evasion have prolifer-
ated in African border regions by virtue of the economic rents that 
conflicting economic policies have generated—and which migration 
controls are currently reinvigorating. Cross-border trade has often been 
associated with particular ethnic groups whose niche has been cemented 
over many years. But illicit trade has also spawned new networks as well 
as transforming older ones. I have compared the case of the Nana Benz of 
Lomé—whose location at the epicenter of a regional trade in contraband 
textiles helped to cement their dominance over the urban marketplace—
with that of the Mouride brotherhood which began with deep roots in 
groundnut farming and subsequently mutated into a transnational 
network, with one foot in contraband and another in international migra-
tion. In both cases, the demarcation of a social boundary was closely 
bound up with participation in cross-border exchange.
This is closely related to the third point concerning the demography of 
borderlands. Border areas have often witnessed amongst the most sus-
tained growth, by virtue of the livelihoods that grow up around trade but 
also because of the relative safety that urbanism provide in unstable 
regions. Border towns and cities are typically cosmopolitan, as they suck 
in populations of diverse national and ethnic origins.
In the final section on the politics of identity, I have pointed to the many 
ambiguities surrounding the ways in which international borders are 
exploited, challenged and internalized by local populations. While some 
actors have sought to exclude or target particular groups on the principle 
that their ethnic affiliation necessarily renders them foreign, borderland-
ers have not been above invoking state actors in defense of their own 
territorial claims. Even where groups such as the Agotime seek to tran-
scend the border and rekindle a shared sense of community, they cannot 
escape the fact that the border has engendered a sense of difference over 
time. This is illustrative of the ways in which borders have served to 
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inscribe social boundaries in a more general sense. In this, as in other 
respects, the African patterns are not so very different from those in other 
parts of the world. Or at least, there are enough commonalities to render 
the work of comparison potentially rewarding.
Notes
1. Some of the research for this article, especially the sections dealing with 
transport corridors and regional integration, was conducted as part of a 
European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant for a project entitled 
“African Governance and Space: Transport Corridors, Border Towns and Port 
Cities in Transition (AFRIGOS)” (ADG-2014-670851), for which I am the 
principal investigator. In East Africa, the research was conducted alongside 
Dr. Isabella Soi of the University of Cagliari, an affiliate of the project, whose 
insights I am grateful for.
2. Tijuana and San Diego are atypical in that the latter is slightly the larger city.
3. ECOWAS brings together the West African anglophone countries of Nigeria, 
Ghana, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, with the francophone countries 
of the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA), consisting of Senegal, Mali, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger, plus Guinea-Bissau. Guinea is a fran-
cophone member of ECOWAS, but is not part of UEMOA. In East Africa, the 
EAC is made up of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South 
Sudan.
4. The Vatican is embedded in Rome, but this is clearly an exceptional case. 
5. I am grateful to Hugh Lamarque for this insight.
6. Interview with Togbe Amenya Fiti V, Aflao, August 26, 2017.
7. I am grateful for having had the chance to read some of the drafts of a forthcom-
ing book by Elaine Peña that deals with an annual festival in which a meeting 
on the bridge between the two Laredos is a highly symbolic moment.
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